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The Confucian Continuities of
Chinese Geopolitical Discourse
Andrew Latham

I. Introduction

I

n the existing literature, Chinese foreign policy is typically
explained in terms of the pursuit of the “national interest.” Such
“realist” explanations assume that these interests are the obvious and
unambiguous correlates of China’s location in the regional and global
political order, and that Chinese policymakers both understand these
interests and pursue them in a rational and instrumental fashion.
The problem with such an approach, however, is that the concept of
national interest is simply too vague and subjective to provide a useful
guide for understanding China’s actual conduct on the world stage.
Chinese policymakers, like their counterparts in other countries, do
not have an unmediated understanding of the global political-economic order; nor are China’s interests obvious, unambiguous, or simply derivative of China’s place in that order. Moreover, policymakers
(in China and elsewhere) are not simply “rational actors” in the sense
implied by political realism or sociological individualism—that is, purposive actors seeking to advance their (self-evident) interests through
the utility-maximizing selection of the most instrumental means for
any given end. Rather, Chinese officials are constituted through, and
embedded in, social and cultural systems that produce the discourses,
narratives, and frames through which they first make sense of the
world and then act in it. To the extent that this is true, realist analyses
of Chinese foreign policy simply cannot tell us much about the historically contingent and culturally inflected content of the national interest
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as articulated and pursued by state officials. In short, realist analyses
typically end up providing little more than incredibly thin accounts
of Chinese foreign policy, accounts that ultimately fail to explain the
recurring patterns of actual Chinese practice on the world stage. What
is needed now is a way of theorizing China’s national interests in ways
that allow us to move from such thin forms of description to a more
satisfying and useful “thick” conceptualization of those interests.
One way of doing this is to adopt the view that state action is, in
fact, a form of social practice in which the national interest is first constructed as a category of practical consciousness and then put into
effect by state officials—rather than reflecting the instrumental pursuit
of objective interests by a rational actor. In this view, while the national
interest is clearly an important explanatory variable in accounts of state
action, it is neither objective nor self-evident. Rather, it is the product
of an inherently social interpretive process that produces specific and
meaningful understandings of what constitutes both the national interest and threats to the national interest. To the extent that this is true,
understanding state action requires an understanding of the processes
of representation and interpretation through which the national interest is constructed and produced. In this essay, I argue that such an
understanding requires a recognition that this representational process is inherently storied and that the constitutive representations that
govern social life are profoundly narrative in form. More specifically,
I argue that the meanings that structure social action are produced
through the pervasive and inescapable practice of knowing the world
and one’s place in it through the construction of ontological narratives.1
These are the stories that actors construct out of available cultural and
linguistic resources to create meaning out of the confusion, complexity, and disorder of lived experience. Simply stated, ontological narratives are constitutive stories; that is, they actually produce (rather than
simply attempt to reflect) social facts. They do this by generating the
specific forms of knowledge, consciousness, “common sense,” theory,
practice, and identity that allow people to understand—and thus act
in—the world. At the level of global politics, such narratives take the
form of geopolitical discourses, which can be thought of as meaninggenerating stories regarding the social field called “international relations.” As Gearóid ô Tuathail puts it, such discourses can usefully be
conceptualized as forms of “discursive practice by which intellectuals
of statecraft ‘spatialize’ international politics in such a way as to represent a ‘world’ characterized by particular types of places, peoples and
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dramas.”2 Like all ontological narratives, they are constitutive; that is,
at the level of practice and consciousness, they organize the world into
a meaningful place by populating it with actors, invest those actors
with identities and (derivative) interests, and script the defining dramas of global political life. Thus, rather than simply providing a more
or less accurate reflection or map of the “objective” realities of a particular world order, geopolitical discourses are in fact profoundly productive of that order.
Ideally, a study of Chinese geopolitical discourse would paint a
detailed picture of the people, places, and defining dramas of world
politics as narratively defined at both the elite and popular levels.
Such a project, however, would be far beyond the scope of this short
article. Instead, my rather more modest objective is to map the “root
narrative” of Chinese geopolitical discourse. Its main argument is that
there are ancient cultural and discursive currents that to this day exercise a powerful influence on Chinese geopolitical thinking and foreign
policy practice. For lack of a better label, this current of thought can
be labeled the “Confucian-Mencian” cultural narrative.3 The following section traces the outlines of this discursive tradition, highlighting
both its imperial roots and its principal contemporary manifestations.
The essay concludes with some thoughts on the limits of a cultural
approach to understanding Chinese foreign policy.
II. The “Root Narrative” of Chinese Geopolitical Discourse
Historically, the Confucian-Mencian narrative depicted a Chinese
world-system that was harmonious, hierarchical, and orderly. In this
geopolitical imaginary, China was represented as the cultural center
of the universe, entitled to the respect and deference of other polities
and peoples with whom it was in contact: “In the traditional Chinese
conception, a country’s cultural greatness determined its power in the
world, so that a state with superior cultural achievements was entitled
to esteem and influence among other states.”4 Simply put, the Confucian-Mencian narrative created a hierarchical, Sino-centric world in
which China enjoyed a “mandate of heaven” to dominate, exploit, and
even assimilate those peoples whom the Chinese believed to be culturally backward.
Relations within and between China and its neighbors were depicted
in the Confucian-Mencian narrative as essentially harmonious and
orderly.5 This is not to suggest that this narrative was blind to the
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possibility of conflict and strife in world affairs. Rather it is to argue
that it viewed conflict as unnatural and aberrant, a condition that was
brought about only by moral failure or inept leadership. According
to the Confucian-Mencian narrative, this essentially harmonious state
of affairs could best be maintained through virtuous behavior, moral
persuasion, and cultural example. The mandate of heaven could best
be preserved if Chinese rulers conducted themselves with propriety
and in a manner consistent with li (Confucian rules of social conduct).
In the Confucian universe, such conduct not only legitimized political rule, it also enhanced the appeal of (subordinate) association with
the Middle Kingdom. Similarly, appeals to peoples who had in some
measure begun to internalize Confucian moral norms were seen as an
effective means of preserving/restoring hierarchy and harmony. Thus,
the moralizing that came to characterize China’s external relations was
“not so much an act of arrogance as [a reflection of] the natural order
of things given the Middle Kingdom’s opulence” and its narratively
derived understanding of power.6
Perhaps not surprisingly, force played only a minor role in the Confucian-Mencian geopolitical discourse. Since harmony could be preserved or restored through moral suasion and example, armed force
was viewed as a relatively minor instrument of statecraft. Indeed, the
resort to warfare was viewed as an admission of moral failure and
poor leadership. Should warfare become unavoidable, the narratively
prescribed strategy was one of “maneuver” (famou) rather than battle
(fabing), of defense rather than offense.7
It has been argued that the decline of the Qing Dynasty and the onset
of the “hundred years of humiliation” triggered the terminal demise of
the Confucian-Mencian geopolitical narrative, paving the way for the
triumph of the essentially Western Realpolitik narrative that has subsequently structured Chinese geopolitical thought and practice. In this
view, the relatively sudden transition from unchallenged hegemon to
weak semi-colonial state, coupled with subsequent efforts to restore
China’s power and wealth, simply exposed the internal contradictions
and delusions of the Confucian-Mencian narrative. Some also argue
that the internalization of this essentially Western global cultural script
was powerfully reinforced by the operation of an indigenous discourse
(first promulgated by Xunzi) that—like Western Realism—emphasized
the corruption of humanity, the conflictual nature of all human affairs,
and the imperative of military self-reliance in an imperfect and very
dangerous world.8
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Careful analysis of contemporary Chinese foreign policy discourse
and practice, however, suggests that this argument may be overstated.
To be sure, the discursive and material realities of contemporary world
order have rendered key elements of the Confucian-Mencian narrative anachronistic. For example, the historical narrative construction of
China as occupying the cultural center of the world is simply not sustainable in the face of the contemporary distribution of cultural power
in the international system. One can also find plenty of evidence to
support the claim that the global cultural script of Realpolitik has largely
displaced the indigenous Confucian-Mencian cultural tradition as the
frame through which Chinese foreign policy officials understand and
thus act in the world. Nevertheless, it seems that at least part of this
narrative, what I call the “root narrative” of Chinese geopolitical discourse, continues to persist, albeit in slightly mutated form.
What are the key elements of this root narrative? At the risk of
oversimplification, they can be summarized in the following terms.
First, the narrative depicts China as a uniquely pacific, defensive, and
non-expansionist power.9 While almost all peoples would narratively
construct their national identity in this way, the Chinese go further
than most in that they view their civilization as being uniquely pacific.
Similarly, the root narrative emphasizes the defensive and non-expansionist nature of China’s identity. In this geopolitical imaginary, China
has never desired an inch of foreign soil. It has never attempted to
conquer or colonize the peoples whom it encountered. In this respect,
Chinese history is often explicitly contrasted with Western, and the
travels of the Ming Dynasty Admiral Zheng Ho are often rhetorically
mobilized to “prove” the point. Similarly, China is represented as a
defensive nation. In this case, the Great Wall is the discursive touchstone, cited widely as the ultimate manifestation and symbol of the
defensive nature of Chinese civilization. One Chinese official pithily
sums up this pacific self-representation in the following terms:
The defensive nature of China’s national defense policy…springs from
the country’s historical and cultural traditions. China is a country with
5,000 years of civilization, and a peace-loving tradition. Ancient Chinese thinkers advocated ‘associating with benevolent gentlemen and
befriending good neighbors,’ which shows that throughout history the
Chinese people have longed for peace in the world and for relations of
friendship with the people of other countries.10
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Second, the root narrative of Chinese geopolitical discourse continues to construct and represent China as a “Great Power,” with a worldhistorical role to play on the global stage. Historically, of course, the
Confucian-Mencian narrative constructed China as a benevolent world
power exercising hegemony over the pre-modern East Asian worldsystem. In this discourse, China was the regional power, superior materially and culturally to most, if not all, of its neighbors. Contemporary
Chinese geopolitical discourse differs from this historical narrative in
that it does not depict China as a current, or even future, hegemon.
Rather, it portrays China as a nation in the process of recovering the
Great Power status it lost as a result of a century of victimization and
humiliation, when it was reduced to a semi-feudal, semi-colonial vassal state of Western and Japanese imperialists.11 On the surface, this
appears to be a dramatic change. However, while the narrative recasting of China as a non-hegemonic state is an important discursive shift,
in fact it masks a deeper continuity in China’s dominant geopolitical
discourse: a self-representation of China as a past and future Great
Power destined to play a major role in world affairs. Put simply, while
the dominant geopolitical discourse continues to depict China as a
regional power with limited global significance, it also portrays China
as a rising power entitled by virtue of its size, culture, and economic
power to a place of pre-eminence in global politics. Significantly, military might is not thought to be part of the equation; rather, power is
conferred by wealth and moral example. Ultimately, this is not that different from the self-representation of China at the heart of the historical Confucian-Mencian imaginary.
Finally, the root narrative of the Chinese geopolitical imaginary continues to emphasize the importance of morality as a source of power.
In the Imperial era, this took the form of a belief that morality (virtuous behavior, moral persuasion, ethical example) was the single most
important source of state power. In contemporary Chinese discourse
and practice, morality is still viewed as a source of power and prestige.
Thus, in ways that might well have been comprehensible to Chinese
officials at any point during the last millennium, China’s foreign policy
continues to be characterized by both a tendency to moralize on the
international stage and a strong desire to be perceived as member in
good standing of the international community. The tendency to moralize was perhaps most evident in the foreign policy of Mao during the
1950s–1970s, although it has by no means disappeared.12 The impulse
to play the role of member-in-good-standing of the international com-
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munity has gained greater force since the 1980s, as evidenced by China’s growing (and increasingly constructive) engagement in a range of
multilateral fora (such as the U.N., WTO, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization). Viewed through a Realist lens, neither China’s moralizing nor its constructive multilateralism is readily comprehensible.
Viewed from a more cultural/constructivist perspective, however, the
latter policy in particular makes considerably more sense. The convergence of a narratively derived (and essentially Confucian-Mencian)
understanding of the nature of power, on the one hand, with a narratively derived (and essentially Confucian-Mencian) self-understanding
of China as a Great Power, on the other, has produced a foreign policy
“script” that inclines Chinese officials to pursue the current foreign
policy of “generally status-quo-oriented constructive activism.”13
III. Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this short study has been to illuminate some of the
cultural and discursive roots of China’s dominant contemporary geopolitical imaginary. Its main argument is that Chinese foreign policy
discourse today is powerfully conditioned by a root narrative that can
trace its lineage to the Confucian-Mencian geopolitical discourse of the
Imperial era. The way in which China’s foreign policy officials understand China’s national interests and subsequently pursue those interests on the international stage are largely derived from this narrative.
By way of conclusion, I would like to register two qualifications to
my argument. First, nothing I have argued should be interpreted as
suggesting that Chinese foreign policy officials are merely “bearers of
culture” who automatically enact the geopolitical scripts entailed in
this root narrative in specific diplomatic settings. Clearly, this is not
the case. To begin with, it is not always obvious which scripts are to
be enacted in any given setting. Social actors are invariably embedded
within multiple, contested, conflicting, competing, and even contradictory discourses (e.g., the Confucian-Mencian and Parabellum paradigms) that shift over time and thus preclude categorical stability of
action. As a result, while those warranted to act on behalf of the imagined community might enact one script in one set of circumstances
(because it is required by their narratively derived sense of being at
that particular time and in that particular setting), in another set of
circumstances alternative narratives might be triggered that involve
a different sense of identity/interest and that entail different scripts of
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appropriate action. Additionally, state officials do not enact narratively
derived scripts without reflection. Rather, they approach the social
world reflexively, acting in terms of their interpretation of the relevant
cultural rules rather than being governed directly by them. This means
that social action cannot simply and unproblematically be read off a
given script. Instead, understanding action requires a recognition that
situated actors actively interpret both scripts and the circumstances
within which they find themselves.
Second, nothing I have argued should be construed as denying the
role of what some have called the Parabellum tradition in the definition
of China’s national interest. As J. D. Yuan argues, within the broader
Chinese cultural tradition, there are in fact two discourses related to
world order and foreign policy. The first, discussed above, derives
from the philosophy of the Confucian scholar Mencius, who saw the
world as harmonious, hierarchical, and relatively peaceful. The other,
derived from the philosophy of another Confucian scholar, Xunzi, portrays the world as disharmonious, dangerous, and inherently conflictual. This latter discourse, typically referred to as the Parabellum or
Realpolitik tradition, has clearly exercised a powerful influence over
Chinese geopolitical discourse and foreign policy practice in both preand post-revolutionary China. To argue otherwise would be intellectually dishonest. But my argument does not depend on making such a
move because the point I am trying to make is that the Confucian-Mencian geopolitical discourse does in fact continue to exercise a powerful
influence over the thinking and conduct of the Chinese policy establishment, contrary to the arguments advanced by many Realist observers of Chinese international policy. Ultimately, then, I am not making
an either-or argument. Rather, I am suggesting that a full account of
the cultural and discursive framing of China’s national interest and foreign policy practice requires an understanding that the two narratives
are not mutually exclusive, but dialectically fused within the Chinese
geopolitical imaginary. While this imaginary is necessarily constantly
evolving in response to historical transformations both within China
and at the level of world order, it is the constant reinterpretation of
these yin and yang discursive threads against the backdrop of concrete
historical circumstances that gives China its distinctive geopolitical
discourse in any given era. 
•
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